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2CHAPTER CIVIC-STATE INTERACTIONS ANDTHE POTENTIAL FORSTRUCTURAL CHANGE
Jeff Handmaker1
On 31 January 2008, South African police officers raided the Central Methodist
Church in Johannesburg. Employing heavy-handed tactics, allegedly including
pepper spray and dogs, the police proceeded to round up suspected
undocumented migrants, who they claimed had no permits to stay in South
Africa.2 Among those arrested were Zimbabwean asylum-seekers who had fled
growing violence in Zimbabwe, and had managed to avoid detention at a
notorious detention facility in Musina on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border,
before seeking refuge in Johannesburg.3 These asylum seekers had a legitimate
right to stay in terms of national and international laws that the South African
government was legally obliged to respect.
In the months that followed the January raid, a growing number of reports
in the media highlighted widespread abuses of asylum-seekers and refugees by the
police and the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). Civic organisations stepped
up their advocacy and launched a series of further public and legal challenges.4
Civic organisations insisted upon the government’s accountability to migrants
and asylum-seekers in general, and condemned the police raids on the Methodist
church.5 
1 This chapter is adapted from Handmaker (2009) ‘Conclusion’, in Advocating for Accountability:
Civic-State Interactions to Protect Refugees in South Africa, pp. 191–211. Antwerp: Intersentia.
2 ‘Raid Highlights Migrant Abuse’, 2008.
3 As explained by Hermes (2008) and others, the growing number of asylum-seekers from
Zimbabwe was due to growing state-organised violence by Mugabe’s authoritarian regime,
which peaked in 2005, in the context of Operation Murambatsvina, and again in April 2008,
following the Zimbabwe government’s rejection of the 29 March 2008 elections.
4 Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) and the Consortium on Refugees and Migrants in South
Africa (CoRMSA) issued a series of press releases condemning the behaviour of the South
African police and the DHA. Later, this series of public challenges was posted on their
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In May, local and international media began reporting a wave of attacks
against foreigners, mainly in township areas. Houses and shops were looted.
People were beaten and even set on fire in the street. By 31 May 2008, at least 62
people had been killed, and many more forced to flee.6 The violence was so
widespread that the government was compelled to establish emergency relief
centres to protect the victims of xenophobic violence. However, in August 2008
the government threatened to close the relief centres,7 while at the same time, the
government refused to close the detention centre in Musina, which had
developed a reputation for widespread abuses, including allegations of torture.8
Civic organisations responded to these developments with co-ordinated
responses and legal challenges that illustrated a growing sophistication in
advocating for accountability. Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) – supported by
numerous other civic organisations, including the Treatment Action Campaign
(TAC), Consortium on Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) and
others – launched constitutional challenges to the closure of the relief centres.9
After South African civic organisations repeatedly appealed for the closure of the
Musina immigrant detention facility – run by the South African Border Police, in
co-ordination with the DHA – LHR found itself supporting the Director-General
of the DHA, who eventually agreed that the facility should be closed. LHR issued
a press release on 20 November 2008:
[LHR] supports the call by the Director-General of the Department of Home
Affairs for the closure of the detention facility in Musina for foreign nationals …
The facility is run by the South African Police Service with no safeguards to prevent
unlawful detentions, the deportation of refugees or independent monitoring of the
conditions of detention.
LHR described the conditions at the Musina detention facility, making extensive
reference to international law and South African law:
We have found large numbers of children, often unaccompanied, detained along
with adults in contravention of both the Constitution and the Children’s Act …
South Africa has been cited for its mistreatment of detainees in immigration
detention by the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention …
[including] abusive handcuffing, beatings with hosepipes and in one incident,
detainees were forced to roll in urine on the floor. Such treatment is not only a
criminal offence, but a violation of South Africa’s obligations under the UN
Convention Against Torture.
Reflecting on a lengthier study that looked at more than a decade of civic
advocacy for government accountability for refugee rights in South Africa,10 this
chapter will revisit the following research question: how can the dynamics of civic
interactions to advocate state accountability to promote, protect and fulfil refugee
6 ‘Xenophobic Attacks Plague the Country’, 2008; ‘Xenophobia Death Toll Hits 62’, 2008.
7 Bell, 2008.
8 Mbelle and Dissel, 2008.
9 IRRI, 2008.
10 Ibid, footnote 1.
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rights in South Africa be strengthened; under what circumstances do civic-state
interactions lead to structural change; and what do these interactions teach us
about the potential and pitfalls of realising rights in general?
Discovering answers to this question will help to explain the emergence of
civic capacity, the strategic importance of recognising the structural boundaries
of the state, and the role of civic actors in mediating the translation of global rules
into local contexts, which can lead to structural change.
This chapter presents the findings of a study of civic-state interactions to
protect the rights of refugees in South Africa, conducted between 2004 and 2008,
which explains how civic actors have interacted with governments through both
co-operation and confrontation. Secondly, it explains the context in which civic
actors have acquired capacity to advocate for government accountability, and
how this has shaped the possibilities for realising refugee rights in South Africa.
Thirdly, the chapter explains the importance of respecting structural boundaries
in a culture of constitutionalism. Fourthly, it explains how civic actors translate
global rules into their locally relevant contexts. Finally, this chapter explains how
civic capacity to realise rights travels across time and space: across time, in terms
of the ongoing relevance of social justice strategies from one historical period to
the next; and across space in terms of the global relevance that social justice
strategies in one country have for similar struggles in different countries.
1 CIVIC CAPACITY, STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES AND 
THE SCOPE FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE
Civic-state interactions in the fourteen years that have passed since the South
African government ratified the international refugee conventions have
reaffirmed the capacity of civic actors to hold states accountable for their human
rights obligations, clarified the structural boundaries of civic-state interactions,
and revealed the scope for these interactions to lead to structural change. 
In seeking to better understand the potential for civic action to lead to
structural change, I have tried to explain the dynamics of civic interactions to
advocate state accountability in promoting, protecting and fulfilling refugee rights
in South Africa; the circumstances under which civic-state interactions lead to
structural change; and the potentials and pitfalls of these interactions in realising
rights in general. Civic interventions to promote the South African state’s
accountability for its human rights obligations are principally understood through
the country’s culture of constitutionalism. Carefully honed in the struggle against
apartheid, civic actors – including lawyers and legal advocacy organisations in the
post-1994 democratic era – have wielded both ‘shield’ and ‘sword’ in their
advocacy of new human rights issues (including refugee rights), advocating a new
kind of ‘politics by other means’.11
11 Abel, 1995.
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In contrast to the pre-democracy era, in which challenges to a government
decision were almost unthinkable, administrative law has proven to be a dynamic
mechanism, available to challenge a government directly on the content of its
policies. It has been a powerful shield against ill-informed, biased or arbitrary
decisions made in individual applications for refugee status. It has also become an
effective sword, both in halting restrictive policies for admission to the country,
and in advocating for economic and social rights, such as the right of refugees to
study, receive social grants, and work in particular employment sectors.
Beyond explaining the civic potential for realising refugee rights, I have
questioned how such a role could be strengthened. Further, I have asked what
this has taught us about the potential of civic interventions in realising rights in
general. Civic advocacy for refugee rights in South Africa demonstrates how state
accountability can be promoted, or in more limited circumstances enforced, by
way of co-operative and confrontational interactions between government and
civic actors. The principal means of explaining the nature of the relationship
between civic actors and the state in these interactions is what Kidder has referred
to as social distance, as measured by divergences in interests, meanings and
political positions; in other words, the externally grounded reasons for
participating in a given civic-state interaction.12
Civic-state interactions in refugee policymaking
The first example of civic-state interactions discussed in the longer study involved
civic actors engaged in the development of national policies to protect refugees
in South Africa. These interactions revealed various opportunities and challenges
for civic actors. In many respects, South Africa is a model of participatory
democracy, in which the government has a duty to ensure that there has been
some level of civic involvement in the policymaking process. While the courts in
South Africa have determined that some specific civic involvement duties are
enforceable, it is generally a matter of discretion as to what form this public
involvement takes.13
Where a process was too one-sided in terms of the dominant role played by
civic actors, the South African government questioned the legitimacy of the
process, as was shown by its reluctance to follow-up on the Refugees Green
Paper. Similarly, when the government neglected to consult civic actors, as was
the case in the development of the Regulations to the Refugees Act, civic actors
contested the outcome of that process, labelling it illegitimate. By contrast, where
civic actors participated actively in a government-led policy initiative – as was the
case in the Refugees White Paper process – the legitimacy of the process, as well
as the possibilities for its implementation, was correspondingly enhanced.
12 Kidder, 1979.
13 Hoexter, 2007: 75–76, commenting on the Doctors for Life case (2006) and the Matatiele case
(2007).
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Broadly speaking, government and civic actors alike welcomed the outcome of
the White Paper process – the Refugees Act.
Clarity regarding the respective roles of civic and state actors has made it
possible to explain the motivations for the participation of each in a policymaking
or implementation process at a particular historical moment. This has in turn
illustrated how the presence of social distance, at that moment, defined the
strategic possibilities for a desirable outcome at a particular time, at least from the
perspective of civic actors participating in a given policy or implementation
process.
In the formation of the Refugees Act of 1998, it was notable that both civic
and government representatives in the White Paper Task Team (as well as most
observers of the process) recognised the need for the Department of Home
Affairs (DHA) to set policy, as long as appropriate consultation also took place.
In other words, the opportunities for exercising civic agency were conditioned by
administrative and legal structures already in existence. Furthermore, there was a
common understanding that the South African government was obliged to give
effect to its ratification of the international refugee conventions. However, this
common understanding did not mean that the views of all civic actors were the
same. Indeed, there were many differences of opinion as to the extent to which
the Refugees White Paper and Bill needed to make explicit reference to the rights
of asylum-seekers and refugees, and to the obligations of the government. 
And yet it was still possible to advocate structural change (in Archer’s
terminology, ‘elaboration’) in the DHA’s legal and administrative structure. The
legal structure that emerged from the White Paper process incorporated
international law principles regarding the status determination procedure, as well
as due process principles contained in South Africa’s constitution. The
administrative structure included various possibilities for internal appeal, as well
as for oversight by the Standing Committee and Refugees Appeal Board.
Civic-state interactions in refugee policy implementation
Unlike in the refugee White Paper policymaking process, the possibilities for civic
actors to influence the direction of the DHA’s policy were more limited in the
context of the second example, namely civic involvement in an ostensibly
government-led project to regularise the legal status of former Mozambican
refugees. This second example of co-operative civic-state interactions was
informed by South Africa’s historical involvement in the violent civil war in
Mozambique, and the legal and administrative structure that had denied these
refugees a formal status.14 By the same token, the desire of the South African
14 According to Rupiya and others (1998), the previous South African government’s support for
the right-wing, opposition RENAMO forces that were fighting the once-Soviet-backed, left-
wing FRELIMO government forces formed part of South Africa’s regional destabilisation
campaign. The civil war in Mozambique generated millions of refugees, many of whom sought
refuge in countries throughout the region, including South Africa.
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government to repair this injustice to the government and people of Mozambique
meant that it was possible for civic actors to promote a correction of this injustice,
and to elaborate the legal and administrative structure by granting these former
refugees legal residential status. Unfortunately, the actual implementation of this
project severely constrained the possibilities for civic agency due to the role of the
leading civic actor, a Dutch NGO known as AWEPA.
As far back as the early 1990s, a Tripartite Commission consisting of the
governments of Mozambique and South Africa, together with the UNHCR,
aimed to resolve the situation for the hundreds of thousands of Mozambican
refugees who ended up in South Africa.15 The commission’s two main
commitments were to repatriate those who wished to return to Mozambique, and
to regularise the legal status of former Mozambican refugees (FMRs) who wished
to remain in South Africa.
When civic actors (and particularly AWEPA) expressed an interest in
facilitating the implementation of the regularisation project, it was clear that the
structural conditions favouring administrative due process were hardly in place
for this to happen. The marked lack of political will on the part of the DHA, and
the shaky legal and administrative structure that finally emerged to implement the
project (which involved extensive closed-door involvement by AWEPA) created
a situation in which the ability of local civic actors and FMRs to exercise their
agency was highly circumscribed. 
Particularly uncomfortable for local civic actors was the role that AWEPA
played in conflating its interests with that of the South African government. The
AWEPA co-ordinator’s lack of distinction between his organisation’s interest and
the interests of the DHA – coupled with AWEPA’s central co-ordinating role –
artificially reduced the social distance between the DHA and local civic actors.
This situation made it extremely difficult for local civic actors to challenge the
behaviour of DHA officials, and ensure that administrative due process was being
respected.
Furthermore, the significance of a credible monitoring presence was under-
emphasised, as were concerns about ‘survival fraud’. Finally, a moratorium on
deportations was first downplayed and then sidelined altogether by the
government, with no objection from AWEPA. To make matters worse, when
civic actors eventually did raise concerns about the project’s implementation,
AWEPA openly undermined them. This combination of factors both
compromised the independence of local civic actors and had catastrophic results
for thousands of FMRs, who were denied regularised status in structural
circumstances that failed to comply with basic standards of administrative due
process.
15 The forming of the Tripartite Commission followed a 1992 peace agreement in Rome between
the two main parties to the Mozambican conflict.
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Litigation and shaming by civic actors
While co-operative interactions represented something relatively new to civic
actors, emerging as they did from political struggle, and later from a negotiated
constitutional transition that led to an accountable government, confrontational
measures – through litigating and shaming the government into fulfilling its
obligations to refugees – have been far more familiar territory for civic advocates.
The history of the anti-apartheid struggle mapped out two specific directions
for civic actors, which to some extent continued in the post-1994 dispensation,
although the experience of advocating refugee rights has tended to stress one
particular direction over the other. As civic actors accustomed to litigating refugee
rights took advantage of expanded opportunities for judicial review of
administrative decisions, as provided for in the constitution, there have been
correspondingly fewer efforts to publicly shame government. On one level this is
surprising, given that advocacy efforts that have combined litigation with a civic
mobilisation campaign (and strategic use of the media) have tended to lead to
more favourable outcomes. On another level, this might be explained by the facts
that (1) the DHA was obliged to radically transform its administrative structure;
and that (2) the opinions of the general public – and the media – were generally
unsympathetic to refugees and migrants.
The potential for structural interdicts to precipitate concrete and lasting
improvements – or structural elaboration, in refugee protection standards –
remains to be seen. Structural interdicts create a special relationship between the
court, government and civic actors in which this elaboration can take place.
However, this relationship also contains underlying tensions. The first (and more
obvious) source of tension is between the government and civic actors, as acutely
observed in the case of LHR (2001), in which the credibility of civic actors and
their ability to challenge government decisions were explicitly brought into
question. The second source of tension is between government and the courts;
civic groups and individuals have only recently been permitted to
comprehensively challenge decisions of the government on the grounds of
whether they have acted in a ‘reasonable’ manner. Hoexter sums up the problem
well:
More than any other ground, review for reasonableness exposes the tension between
two conflicting judicial emotions: the fear of encroaching on the province of the
executive arm of government by entering into the merits of administrative decisions,
and the desire for adequate control over the decisions of administrative authorities.16
In other words, the courts in South Africa have faced the structural dilemma of
maintaining what Klaaren has referred to as a ‘delicate balance’ between, on one
hand, allowing government to fulfil its role in determining the content of policy
16 Hoexter, 2007: 293–294.
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and its implementation, and, on the other, acting as a constitutional check on
government abuse of power.17
From structural conditioning to structural change: translators, 
social distance and public law
These three examples of civic-state interactions explain how the opportunities for
civic agency have specific historical roots – which have conditioned civic agency
to promote, protect and fulfil human rights, but have also allowed for structural
elaboration (or structural change). Civic actors have fulfilled an important
mediating role in the translation of global rules into the development,
implementation and challenges of national policies. This study of civic advocacy
for refugee rights in South Africa has also emphasised the importance of social
distance as a strategic factor for civic actors, when assessing the possibilities for
interacting with government in promoting state accountability towards refugees.
Finally, this study highlights the usefulness of public (administrative and
constitutional) law as a means of translating global rules into their local,
vernacular contexts, and enforcing state accountability to international human
rights norms.
As the following sections explain, civic interactions to advocate state
accountability for respecting refugee rights can be explained through three
theoretical propositions. Firstly, the capacity of civic actors to promote and
impose state accountability is shaped by structural changes in the normative
international and national legal frameworks. Secondly, boundaries which define
the structural relationship between civic actors and the state shift in very specific
ways; these must be understood by civic actors (agents) if they want to be strategic
and successful in their advocacy efforts. And finally, civic actors play a crucial role
in mediating the translation of international legal norms into local contexts.
2 CONTEXT SHAPES THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CIVIC-
STATE INTERACTIONS
The social and political context from which civic actors have emerged has shaped
both the nature of civic organisations and the possibilities for civic actors to
influence state policies, mobilise for their enforcement, and hold states
accountable. In South Africa, two distinct types of civic actors emerged from a
long political struggle against racist governmental policies. The first mobilised in
strategic, proactive ways to resist the apartheid regime. The other type of civic
17 Klaaren, 2006b.
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actor supported this resistance, mainly by engaging in ‘politics by other means’18
through a range of legal interventions, from providing protection to those facing
potential torture in the course of police interrogations, to challenging forced
removals by blocking the implementation of the Group Areas Act.
Since the country’s first democratic elections in 1994, civic actors have
operated in a rapidly shifting context that has challenged civic actors, and
especially legal advocates, to develop new strategies. With the emergence of a
constitutional culture, and a correspondingly accountable government in South
Africa, civic actors have not only had to challenge government in order to hold it
accountable; they have also been obliged to engage in policymaking and
implementation programmes, supporting government when it has demonstrated
a willingness to move in a progressive direction. 
Where co-operative interactions have failed, confrontational strategies by
civic actors have tried to fill the gap in legal protection. However, litigation on its
own tends to provide little guarantee of a productive outcome. Well co-ordinated
civic advocacy strategies, combining public shaming and mass mobilisation with
legal interventions, have produced the most successful outcomes.
The process of developing refugee policy in South Africa has drawn upon
global policy discussions on refugee protection. In particular, the refugee policy
discussion in South Africa has engaged in debating whether refugee law ought to
be ‘reformulated’ in order to correspond better with state interests, or,
alternatively, ‘reinvigorated’ in order to correspond better with its original
intentions. The dominant position advocated by civic organisations in the process
of refugee policy formulation in South Africa has more closely reflected
Goodwin-Gill’s view that mechanisms to encourage compliance need
strengthening, and that NGOs play an important role in this respect.19 Refugee
rights are the product of contestation, and civic actors have endorsed the need for
institutional strengthening to ensure state compliance. Furthermore, the process
of forming a refugee policy has demonstrated that the principal medium through
which these rights are realised is the field of administrative law.
Pressures on the DHA to produce a new refugee policy came both internally
and from outside, partly because of its ratification of the UN and OAU Refugee
Conventions in 1996. With the ratification of these documents, and South
Africa’s increasing prominence in international relations, the DHA came under
particular pressure both from the UNHCR and other arms of government,
including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ANC parliamentarians, to give
18 Abel, 1995, passim.
19 Goodwin-Gill, 1999.
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permanent effect to these international commitments. However, the
opportunities for civic interaction were constrained by structural factors from
within the then-Government of National Unity. Buthelezi, of the opposition
Inkatha Freedom Party, remained Minister of Home Affairs for some years, and
openly clashed with the ANC on the government’s policy towards refugees and
migrants.
Consequently, as Crush and McDonald argued, ‘progressive immigration
reform was ultimately held hostage to the broader politics of IFP appeasement’
in the Unity government.20 In some cases, civic actors used this to their
advantage, as when lawyers challenged the DHA’s crude ‘safe third country’
policy.
Furthermore, the DHA (following the advice of US government officials
who drafted many of the Regulations to the Refugees Act) has appeared to follow
the mantra of ‘irregular migration’, which holds that explicit provisions to protect
refugees lead to abuse of the procedure. If this assessment is correct, it explains
the reluctance of the DHA to engage civic actors in the development of the
Regulations. Whatever the reasons, this proved to be a strategic miscalculation on
the part of government. While civic participation in the development of the
Refugees Act created a basis for co-operative civic-state interactions, the DHA’s
lengthy and non-consultative development of the Regulations, set the
Department on an inevitable path of confrontation with civic actors.
The contextual challenges faced by civic actors in promoting a
comprehensive administrative law regime (by way of co-operative interactions
that translate South Africa’s global human rights obligations appropriately) have
been considerable. As Klaaren has noted,21 the asylum-determination procedure
in South Africa – and the rule of law in general – have operated for some time in
a climate in which opportunities to claim rights have been decidedly limited –
particularly prior to 1994. Although structural shifts have been noted with regard
to the policy itself, implementation of the asylum procedure has become steadily
more restrictive since its introduction in 1993.
Civic-state interactions must be seen as a cumulative process demanding
ongoing reflection, possible co-operation, and (potentially) confrontation as well.
By explicitly translating South Africa’s international obligations and the rights
contained in the constitution into the Refugees Act, civic actors have promoted
a situation in which the DHA is obliged to correct its own behaviour. Where this
has not succeeded, civic participation has advocated government accountability
through a string of legal challenges to the DHA’s policies. 
20 Crush and Mcdonald, 2001: 9.
21 Klaaren, 2006b.
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3 RESPECTING STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES IN A 
CULTURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
The strategic importance of civic actors in respecting structural boundaries is
especially important in a country that respects a culture of constitutionalism. As
mentioned earlier, this creates a primary tension in which civic actors may (1)
support government as it expresses a desire to move in a progressive direction,
but in addition (2) would want to maintain their critical independence. In this
section, the structural conditioning of civic actors is explained in relation to the
possibilities for structural elaboration, followed by a discussion of the
circumstances in which civic actors make strategic choices on the basis of their
assessment of the state-created structural boundaries with which they interact.
Structural conditioning of civic actors and the possibilities for 
elaboration
It has been possible to explain the outcome of civic refugee rights advocacy from
a structure-agency view that draws on Archer’s approach of analytical dualism.
This approach assumes that specific historical events determine state-created
structures, and that the exercise of civic agency has been conditioned by these
structures. This approach also assumes that civic actors are able to elaborate these
structures through a strategic assessment, thereby contributing to structural
change.
On one hand, the three main illustrative examples of this study have
demonstrated that civic advocacy interventions have played a significant role in
holding states accountable. On the other hand, these same examples have
confirmed that state accountability is by definition state-centred; civic actors that
place themselves too centrally in a civic-state interaction – such as in the Refugees
Green Paper policymaking process, or the AWEPA-led regularisation project –
risk eclipsing this essential role of the state or government. Consequently, while
the role of civic actors in promoting legal and social normative compliance is
important, it should not be over-emphasised. The principal responsibility for
realising rights always remains with the state.
Civic actors played key roles in the process of negotiated transition, and
continue to fulfil multiple roles in South Africa’s participatory democracy by
making oral and written contributions to parliamentary hearings, participating in
policy task teams, and even engaging in joint civic-state implementation projects.
As Arnstein argues, assessment of whether this participation is ‘meaningful’ and
‘likely to have an impact’ depends from which rung of the ladder the civic actors
make contributions. These range from the state avoiding civic participation
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altogether, through forms of manipulation, to ‘token’ consultation, and finally to
‘partnership, delegated power and citizen control’.22
In navigating the narrow but significant channels for advocating state
accountability, civic actors have assessed and made strategic decisions, based on
their growing knowledge of global standards of refugee protection, to interact
with government on the basis of structural boundaries on which civic actors
believe the government might be prepared to compromise. A strategic
consideration of this principal conditioning factor increases the likelihood that a
civic-state interaction will lead to structural change.
Civic agencies’ capacity to interact with and elaborate the country’s legal and
administrative structure providing for the reception of refugees and the
determination of their legal status arises from specific historical events. In the
context of refugee rights protection in South Africa, these events were related to
a long-fought social justice struggle for dignity and self-determination, which was
ultimately overtaken by a process of negotiated transition, during the course of
which the state abandoned minority rule, and a democratic, accountable
government came into being.
As South Africa has emerged from international isolation and begun to re-
engage with the international legal and political order, the new government has
been obliged to change its approach to refugees. Even during the apartheid era,
the government demonstrated a willingness to allow applications for refugee
status on an individual basis, beginning with the Russian applicants. Post-1994,
the democratic government also welcomed critical civic voices in the elaboration
of a comprehensive refugee policy through a new legal and administrative
structure – at least initially. This openness changed as government took a more
defensive stance against civic criticism; but as the White Paper process illustrated,
possibilities still remained for structural elaboration of the refugee policy and its
implementation.
Structural boundaries and strategic choices
Successful civic-state interactions depend on the strategic choices made by civic
actors on the basis of a sober appreciation of state-created structural boundaries
that not only condition their agency, but also allow for structural elaboration. By
extension, the roles and responsibilities of both civic and state actors must be
clear. This applies to any such civic-state interaction, whether it is the
development of a nationally enforceable human rights policy, participation in an
implementation project to realise human rights, or the enforcement of human
rights obligations against a state. In all instances, the principal responsibility lies
with the state and its government, although civic actors often play a
complementary role as ‘translators’ of global rules in local contexts.
22 Reference to Arnstein in Hoexter, 2007: 79–80.
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By drawing on the knowledge of the specific historical circumstances
surrounding a government department that is the focus of a civic interaction, a
variety of strategic responses can be made. In Archer’s assessment, taking time to
assess the structural challenges in which a civic interaction will take place is
essentially about ‘being human’, not least because civic agency itself produces
structurally conditioning factors. As Archer claims: ‘people are indeed perfectly
uninteresting if they possess no personal powers which can make a difference.’23
This entails a careful consideration as to who is representing a government
department, what particular issue is at stake, how the government has handled
itself in the past, what resources are available to the government to respond to the
claims against it, and why government may be motivated to take action at all.
For example, individual government officials may have particular views or
experiences that shape their interpretation of a particular policy. The issue of
asylum-seekers’ right to work will be an especially sensitive one for the DHA,
which also represents the interests of South African citizens. This is just one
example of the kinds of meanings, interests and/or political positions that shape
how government officials frame, interpret and enforce a particular policy. Civic
actors must always bear these in mind when formulating strategy.
In making strategic choices, civic actors may (and should) assume that it is
always primarily government’s task to develop policy, not just as a matter of good
governance, but in order to facilitate greater buy-in to that policy. Of course, this
is not to say that civic organisations should not play a role. Indeed, governments
often consult civic actors as experts or as concerned stakeholders. In some cases,
there may even be a legal obligation to consult. Civic actors also participate in
policymaking processes by confronting the state with their obligations during a
legislative process.
Just as it is primarily government’s responsibility to make policy, it is also
primarily the responsibility of government to implement it. Civic actors can (and
often do) participate in policy implementation projects. They train officials,
advise on implementation frameworks, and even provide services on behalf of
government. Civic actors do this in order to encourage and support government
when it has displayed a willingness to move in a progressive direction. Such
interventions ought not to be conducted uncritically, since there is always the
danger of governmental and civic responsibilities becoming blurred. While civic
actors have recognised the utility of supporting government in carefully defined
circumstances, they have also learned the pitfalls of becoming unwitting
apologists for maladministration.
Finally, enforcement of policy is (or ought to be) also primarily the
responsibility of government, through self-corrective mechanisms. These may be
components of the trias politica, with the elected legislative and independent
judicial branches of government holding the executive accountable without the
23 Archer, 2000: 19.
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need for civic intervention. Enforcement may also take place though an
independent, constitutionally protected institution such as an ombudsman, semi-
autonomous commission, or auditor-general. Unfortunately, more often than
not, such mechanisms are inadequate, and so the roles of civic actors have
become crucial complements in national and global efforts to hold states
accountable to their international obligations. These may include initiating a claim
through judicial review in the courts, appealing to a global institution such as a
human rights treaty body, publicly shaming the government through generating
attention in the media, or communicating a strong, collective message by way of
mass mobilisation.
The elaboration of the legal and administrative structures that define South
Africa’s refugee policy also illustrates how these structures are cultural systems
that are susceptible to change. As the next section explains, civic translators have
played an important role in the process of elaborating these cultural systems.
4 MEDIATING THE TRANSLATION OF GLOBAL RULES 
INTO LOCAL CONTEXTS
In this study I have tried to illustrate how civic actors have contributed to a
culture of constitutionalism, which has both national and international
dimensions that highlight the utility of administrative law as a principal medium
for translating global rules into local contexts. Furthermore, the examples
provided in this study of civic advocacy for refugees have shown how civic actors
can mediate the translation of global norms into local contexts, critically engaging
within the external relationship – as measured by social distance – that always
exists between civic actors and the government, represented by divergent
interests, meanings and political coalitions. From different disciplinary
perspectives, these illustrative examples have shown how civic actors could have
an influence – at least in a modest way – on the content of laws and policies to
protect refugees in South Africa, and on the manner in which they are
implemented.
Legal culture and civic translators
As socio-legal scholars maintain, legal culture is itself an object of investigation.
This can be either the ‘internal legal culture’24 of legal academics and
practitioners, courts and other institutions, or how the legal culture is shaped by
external factors. As Cotterrell has put it:
participants in law are not just lawyers but all those who seek to use legal ideas for
their own purposes, to promote or control the interests of others … understand legal
ideas in practical terms … legal ideas are a means of structuring the social world.25
24 Friedman, 1975.
25 Cotterrell, 1998: 192.
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Evaluating the role of civic interventions to enhance state accountability for
promoting and respecting refugee rights in South Africa entails a critique of many
different variables that characterise the legal culture in which civic actors operate.
This study has considered the approaches and means, as well as the mechanisms,
adopted by civic actors to promote the South African government’s
accountability to refugees in terms of its global and constitutional legal normative
obligations. As already shown, the government had clear interests, demonstrated
by its inviting civic participation in the White Paper Task Team. Clear – though
distinctly different – interests motivated civic actors’ participation in the refugee
policymaking process. Consequently, the task team became a highly productive
mechanism through which the competing interests of civic actors, the state and
other bodies such as the UNHCR and Section Nine institutions (most notably the
South African Human Rights Commission) could be mediated.
A less productive mechanism was employed by AWEPA and the DHA to
regularise the status of FMRs, in which the interests of civic actors were far less
clear – and in some cases, inextricably linked with those of the government. As a
result, the potential of South African civic actors to exercise their agency was not
only attenuated, but the due process of FMRs themselves became dangerously
compromised, as there was no critical monitoring presence or independent
mechanism of appeal.
Moore determined three decades ago that semi-autonomous social fields
exist in which social actors are affected by legal norms, but that they also adapt
by establishing their own social norms. In other words, each semi-autonomous
social field is capable of producing its own rules, but is also vulnerable to external
forces.26 Merry’s development of Moore’s ideas into a theory that explains how
global norms become translated or ‘vernacularised’ into local contexts provides a
useful explanation for how rights translators have emerged, translating global
rules through contributions towards policymaking processes, including (in South
Africa) co-operation in refugee policymaking and implementation projects.27
By participating in global refugee protection discussions, a number of South
African NGOs and academics became familiar with international rules designed
to protect refugees; in other words, they became trans-national elites. However,
their participation in the refugee policymaking process in South Africa remained
conscious of local realities, which included the manner in which the refugee
policy had been implemented since 1993. Consequently, they possessed what
Merry terms a ‘double consciousness’.28 This made them effective translators of
global rules, drawing on human rights as a resource both in terms of their
substantive content (as a tool) and in the possibilities for the realisation of these
rights (their consciousness). In addition, these legal translators had access to
various legal enforcement institutions. Furthermore, by employing extra-legal
26 Moore, 1978.
27 Merry, 2006b.
28 Merry, 2006b: 217.
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mechanisms, such as using the media to shame government when necessary, they
created more space to engage with government on a critical basis.
Appreciating the value of social distance
Evaluating interactions in terms of social distance is another means of assessing
civic participation, for the purpose of understanding the potential of civic
interventions in realising refugee rights in South Africa, and in realising rights in
general. As this study of civic advocacy for refugees has illustrated, the
corresponding social distance between government lawmakers and civic actors
has narrowed or widened according to the strategic decisions taken by civic
actors, with various consequences.
The externally grounded reasons for civic participation in the process of
refugee policy reform in South Africa diverged from those of the government, in
terms of interests and meanings, but there were important areas of convergence
in terms of political positions. During the refugee policymaking process, there
were disagreements on the explicit wording of entitlements that refugees would
be given as protected persons, in accordance with the country’s constitutional and
international obligations. On the other hand, the government generally agreed to
implement refugee status determination through a hearings-based procedure, as
proposed by civic actors. Therefore, the degree of social distance created by
whether or not civic actors and government diverged or converged in their
political positions on a particular policy issue varied considerably throughout the
policymaking process, although convergence of political positions was clearly
necessary before government would be willing to adopt a particular measure.
Government always had the last word.
During the implementation of a status regularisation project for former
Mozambican refugees (FMRs), the social distance or externalisation between
AWEPA and the South African government was initially very great, as civic actors
raised multiple concerns about how the project ought to be implemented.
However, the interests, meanings and political positions of civic actors and the
government became almost indistinguishable as the project took final shape and
a critical monitoring presence was abandoned. What began as an ostensibly
government-run project became known as the AWEPA project. In the absence
of a credible monitoring presence, this social distance remained narrow
throughout the project’s implementation, resulting in limited space for critical
responses by civic actors, and an administrative justice deficit for the FMRs.
Where refugee rights have been litigated, the social distance between civic
actors and the government (as measured by their respective interests, meanings
and political positions) has remained substantial, as civic actors have affirmed
their role as an independent critical voice. And yet, even in these circumstances,
it has not always been possible to hold the government accountable.
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The courts have often proven reluctant to question the merits of a
government’s policy or exercise of discretion. But even where judges have found
against the government, lawyers have often had to return to the courts,
sometimes repeatedly, in order to secure compliance with an order or to argue a
virtually identical case to one litigated earlier. In short, a high degree of social
distance, or independent critical voice, has not been a reliable indicator of success.
Not all legal challenges necessarily produce results.
However, a distinction should be made between litigation aimed at
restraining government behaviour, in which more social distance exists, and cases
aimed to promote good behaviour, which tend to involve a narrowing of the
social distance. Put simply, the first type of case negatively insists that a certain
policy be stopped, and tends to be more likely to succeed, while the other
positively encourages the government to improve itself, which has proven to be
more problematic. As one lawyer has argued:
confrontations are necessary ... [and] it is easier to engage in public interest litigation
when trying to stop something from happening; for example, seeking to stop the
deportation of an asylum-seeker by way of an urgent interdict. It is not so easy to
insist that something happens.29
Structural interdicts may offer new possibilities in the latter type of case. Where
structural interdicts have been ordered to encourage good government
behaviour, social distance has narrowed, as competing interests and political
positions between government and civic actors have been replaced by structural
undertakings by government to the court that it will take deliberate steps to
improve a situation. Civic actors in such cases have made contributions in helping
the government to improve its behaviour. In the access cases, for example,
process engineers who were hired by the DHA, on the basis of a consent order,
to improve management and procedures at the Refugee Reception Offices, spent
considerable time interviewing the civic actors who had brought the case against
the government. While it is still too early to assess its lasting impact, the structural
interdict may yet prove to be a significant tool to ensure positive compliance,
since the process of reporting back to the court recognises both the legitimate
interests of both civic actors and the government, and the essentially voluntary
nature of human rights implementation.
29 Interview with S. Magardie, 2006.
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Ultimately, social distance can explain the potential for civic interactions to
lead to structural change within the government by assessing the extent to which
government has conceded to demands by civic actors in sharing their meanings,
interests or political positions. This deserves further empirical study. In recent
years, the DHA has faced persistent demands for reform from civic
organisations, which have grown more sophisticated in their advocacy. Civic
actors representing various groups and interests have protested – often
simultaneously – to the media, parliament and courts about abuse by government
officials, departmental inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement.
The DHA has responded to a considerable extent to these demands from
civic organisations, and has initiated a consultative process to amend the Refugees
Act. A draft bill was released for public comment in 2007.30 Following public
hearings in South Africa’s parliament that involved several civic organisations,31
and responding to long-standing criticisms from civic organisations about gaps in
the refugee policy and its implementation, the government released a further draft
bill in March 2008.32 The government has also responded to the concerns raised
by civic actors by calling for the closure of the Musina detention facility, as
described above. Furthermore, the DHA initiated a ‘turnaround strategy’ that has
involved participation from a number of civic actors, and the Minister has
responded directly to questions regarding mismanagement of the DHA.33
With these acknowledgements from the government – to some extent, in
response to the demands of civic actors – the social distance between civic actors
and the government has narrowed as their respective interests in refugee
protection and meanings about what this protection entails have converged, but
not to the point that civic organisations have abandoned their critical monitoring
role. Drawing on specific obligations contained in international and South
African law, CoRMSA’s June 2008 Annual Report comprehensively addresses the
obligations of South Africa’s local and national government to protect refugees
and migrants, from the role of government in addressing the root causes of
xenophobic violence to its role in facilitating access to employment and basic
services.34 As the report confirms, while to some extent the interests and
meanings of civic actors and the government may have converged, their
respective political positions continue to diverge, as civic actors remain focused
on holding the South African government – and especially the DHA –
accountable for its legal obligations to protect refugees and migrants.
30 Government of South Africa, ‘Publication of the draft Refugees Amendment Bill 2007’,
General Notice 730 of 2007, Government Gazette No. 29976, 7 June 2007.
31 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, ‘Refugees Amendment Bill: Public Hearings’, Audio and
written transcripts available at: http://www.pmg.org.za/print/11282. Last checked 29 August
2008.
32 Government of South Africa, ‘Refugees Amendment Bill’, Government Gazette No. 30835,
B11-2008, 4 March 2008. Available at: http://www.pmg.org.za/files/bills/080313b11-08.pdf.
Last checked 29 August 2008.
33 ‘DHA Turnaround Strategy’, 2007.
34 CoRMSA Annual Report, 2008.
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5 CIVIC CAPACITY TO REALISE RIGHTS IN GENERAL
The interactions explored in this study concern the role of South African civic
actors in developing the government’s refugee policy, implementing policy, and,
in certain cases, forcing government to comply with its policy through litigation.
However, these civic-state interactions hold universal lessons for realising rights
in general, across time (at different points in South Africa’s history) and space (in
other countries and as part of other human rights struggles). In applying these
generalisations, the notion of the state in terms of its more formal institutions,
such as the courts and Parliament, might need to be distinguished from the ‘less
cuddly’, less caring and occasionally violent aspects of the state, such as the police
and municipal governments that directly threaten civic action and fail to provide
public services.35 At the same time, one must be cautious about over-
essentialising these aspects of the state; not all police officers are violent, and not
all municipal government officials are necessarily uncaring towards refugees and
migrants.36
Realising rights across time (in South Africa)
This study of civic advocacy for refugees provides vivid illustrations of the
interplay between civic actors and the state in promoting a culture of
constitutionalism for all persons (in the language of the Constitution) and not just
South African citizens. Refugees and asylum-seekers who demonstrated in front
of Union Buildings in 1996, demanding that the UNHCR and South African
government respond to their predicament, did not merely generate interest in the
media. Just as the defiance campaigns in South Africa from the 1950s mobilised
thousands of South Africans to re-examine their position and resist apartheid, the
July 1996 demonstration critically engaged South Africans in re-examining their
relationship with refugees; and it precipitated a response from civic organisations.
The July 1996 refugee demonstration took place at a historical moment.
Having just brought into being the country’s final constitution, South Africa was
at a crossroads. Other external factors certainly also played a role, particularly the
government’s obligations acquired as the result of having assented to
international refugee conventions. Rather than only holding government
accountable, the demonstration spurred on South African civic actors, mobilising
them not just to provide assistance, but also to advocate wide-ranging
improvements in the way refugees were received and integrated at that time. In
the months and years following the demonstration, South African lawyers,
churches and other civic organisations were eventually instrumental in achieving
a good refugee policy, sound implementation and a more accountable
government.
35 As observed by Peter Alexander at the Mobilising Social Justice conference in Johannesburg on 23
November 2009.
36 As observed by Darshan Vigneswaran at the Mobilising Social Justice conference in Johannesburg
on 23 November 2009.
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South Africa now has a government policy that has translated international
human rights obligations towards refugees, joint refugee-NGO initiatives that
have secured key rights for refugees, and a number of landmark legal challenges
through the South African courts, with which to confront the government with
its obligations towards non-South Africans in general, and refugees in particular.
Of course, the picture has not always been so positive. As legal advocates
have paid more attention to this issue, reports have emerged of arbitrary
detention and ill-treatment at the hands of the police and immigration officers,
poorly motivated refusals to grant refugee status, and allegations of corruption
and abuse of power.
Ten years after South Africa became party to the international refugee
conventions and the country’s final constitution came into being, the government
faced another crossroads. Building a culture of constitutionalism has demanded
responses at multiple levels. At the local level, municipalities have begun to see
migrants from other countries, including asylum-seekers and refugees, as citizens
of Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg. Confronted by lawyers and as-yet-
unfulfilled obligations created by structural interdicts, national government has
begun to respond seriously to technical, process and management-related
problems in implementing a fair and efficient status-determination procedure.
Most notably, the government has accepted the need to develop and improve
policy through amendments by way of parliamentary process rather than through
ad hoc administrative regulations.
Finally, at a global level, South Africa has been actively engaging in global
policy discussions on migration that are edging towards containment, with so-
called irregular migration as their centrepiece.37 On the other hand, South Africa
has noted the highly unproductive and even violent consequences of maintaining
a restrictive policy that unduly prioritises national interests over its international
obligations to protect migrants in general, and refugees in particular.
Realising rights across space (other struggles in different 
countries)
Recalling the measures used to hold the government accountable in the past on
the basis of international human rights norms also resonates with other social
justice struggles in different countries. The importance of clear roles and
responsibilities and strategic recognition of structural boundaries both have
global application beyond the South African scenario. The strategies and moral
resonance of South Africa’s anti-apartheid struggle have motivated accountability
advocates around the world, and not necessarily because what happened in the
country was unique. South Africa’s struggle against racial injustice, and the efforts
37 Ghosh, 1998, passim.
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that have been made to achieve social transformation, reflect universal principles
that define any social justice struggle engaged in advocating for accountability.
For example, civic actors in Eastern European countries, many of whom are
recent member-states of the European Union (EU), have mobilised for better
protection standards for refugees and migrants by recognising EU-determined
structural boundaries, and by translating global refugee protection standards into
national advocacy efforts to protect refugees.38 Civic actors in Eastern Europe,
whose activities prior to the early 1990s were highly constrained, have also
participated in the development of refugee policies.39
In the Middle East, civic actors also play important roles in refugee
protection. A deeply problematic geo-political situation and ongoing military
occupation prevent a local, rights-based solution to the plight of Palestinian
refugees, and serious structural constraints make it virtually impossible to
advocate for the accountability of Israel, especially concerning Palestinian
refugees. Consequently, civic actors around the world – including academics,
lawyers, church leaders and pressure groups – have managed to generate
widespread global awareness concerning the issue of historical, and continuing,
dispossession of Palestinians. Furthermore, may of these groups have responded
to a call by Palestinian civil society organisations for the economic, social, cultural
and political isolation of Israel through boycotts, divestment and sanctions
(BDS).40 Furthermore, by recognising structural limitations and shifting to supra-
national mechanisms instead, civic actors have advocated strategically for
recognition of Palestinian residency and refugee rights to particular UN agencies’
international legal processes. Lacking impact at the local level, civic actors have
translated Palestinian rights to UN organisations and treaty bodies, including the
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.41 Third states have
also become an important forum for civic actors, making legal claims against
companies that participate in violations of Palestinian refugee and residency
38 As Lavanex (1999) has argued, refugee rights advocacy and policy development in Eastern
European countries has been intrinsically linked with their desire to become part of the
European Union. With the possibility of gaining admission to the EU taking on greater
momentum, countries such as Bulgaria have steadily brought their country’s policies into line
with EU expectations, including the European Union’s human rights requirements, while
simultaneously having to contend with great political uncertainty regarding the gradual
harmonisation of asylum policies at the level of the EU. Much of this work has been conducted
together with the European Council on Refugees and Exiles. See http://www.ecre.org. Last
checked on 29 August 2008.
39 UNHCR, ‘Summary report of the Varna joint meeting’, Bulgaria, 28 February 2002. Available
at: http://www.unhcr.bg/events_records/2002/varna_workshop/summary_ report_varna.
pdf. Last checked on 29 August 2008.
40 For example, the Badil Resource Centre on Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights has
worked with grass-roots activists and solidarity partners around the globe to advocate respect
for international law towards Palestinian refugees. See www.badil.org. Last checked on 6
September 2008.
41 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of reports submitted by
states parties under Article 9 of the Convention Israel, Seventieth session 19 February–9 March
2007, CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, March 2007; Badil Resource Centre on Palestinian Residency
and Refugee Rights, Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2006–2007,
Bethlehem, 2007.
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rights,42 and against individuals who have committed war crimes against civilians
in refugee camps.43
Whether in South Africa, Eastern Europe or Palestine, and regardless of
whether civic actors are engaged in a political struggle or a process of social
transformation in co-operation with government, all these events can be seen as
various forms of social justice struggle. In any social justice struggle, the key to
civic actors being able to hold states and governments accountable for their
human rights obligations lies in civic actors making strategic choices.
Making strategic choices has various implications for civic actors, as this
study of realising refugee rights in South Africa has illustrated. First, civic actors
must appreciate the social, political and legal context in which they operate; this
historical appreciation reveals certain structural boundaries to realising rights that
are nearly always imposed by the state. Second, civic actors must critically assess
the structural boundaries that condition their behaviour, but also have the
potential for structural change or ‘elaboration’, through civic interaction with the
state in formal (and also informal) interventions. Third, civic actors must
appreciate the social distance that always exists between themselves and the
government, measured by divergences in meanings, interests and political
positions. Through a critical engagement in this ‘external’ relationship, it is
possible for civic actors to capitalise on these divergences in advocating a state’s
accountability for realising human rights. Whether the social distance ought to be
narrowed or broadened at a particular moment depends on (1) the context in
which this takes place, (2) the structural boundaries that exist, and (3) the desired
outcome.
A critical engagement with the government allows civic actors, including legal
advocates, to take advantage of that narrow, but significant space for achieving
structural change. In this social, political and legal space, the potential for
advocating the accountability of a state to promote, protect and fulfil human
rights can flourish.
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